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CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF STATE AUTHORITY
OVER NUCLEAR POWER AND WASTE DISPOSAL
While the federal government was promoting the development of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy,' the question of effective, long-term
nuclear waste disposal was left in blissful confidence to the success of
future scientific research. 2 This failure to establish a national policy to
insure a proper and safe method for the disposal of radioactive waste
has been called "unconscionable" 3 and criticized as a "nonpolicy of
indecision and delay."' 4 Recently, Congress attempted to legislate a national solution to the problem of radioactive waste disposal. After extensive debate, Congress pared down a comprehensive, national
program 5 to a simple bill which delegated "responsibility" for one type
1. In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
Congress declared:
Atomic energy is capable of application for peaceful as well as military purposes ...
[T]herefore. . . (a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed
so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare,. . . and (b) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world
peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free
competition in private enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976).
2. The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources has reported that:
Over the past twenty years, operating civilian nuclear powerplants have generated considerable volumes of spent fuel and other radioactive wastes of varying lifetimes and
toxicities. During this time the establishment by the Federal Government of a definitive
policy for the long-term storage or disposal of these wastes has not been granted high
priority. Meanwhile the quantities of civilian nuclear wastes have continued to grow.
S. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6933,
6934 [hereinafter cited as S. Rep.].
The courts have also been confronted with cases challenging this failure to provide adequate
disposal facilities. For example, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978), the plaintiff sued to compel the administrative agency responsible for implementing the Atomic Energy Act to determine whether radioactive waste could be safely disposed of before granting new licenses for nuclear power
generation. The court noted that "it is clear that from the very beginnings of commercial nuclear
power the Congress was aware of the absence of a permanent waste disposal facility, but decided
to proceed with power plant licensing." Id. at 170. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission [hereinafter cited as NRC] had premised its decision to continue licensing, even though
no technology for waste disposal exists, on its "reasonable confidence that wastes can and will in
due course be disposed of safely." Natural Resources Defense Council, Denial of Pet. for
Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,391, 34,393 (1977). See also Minnesota v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and Seiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposa" The Emerging Issue of Sates' Rights, 13 AKRON L. REV. 261, 263-67 (1979) (failure of governmental agencies to develop effective waste disposal programs).
3. 126 CONG. REC. S9975 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
4. 126 CONG. REC. S10264 (daily ed. July 30, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
5. The original bill was introduced in the Senate on July 28, 1980, 126 CONG. REc. S9970,
and described in S. Rep., supra note 2, at 6939-47. For a discussion of the original bill, see notes
118-43 and accompanying text infra.
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of radioactive waste to the states. This compromise bill was enacted as
6
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act.
Prior to the passage of the Low-Level Waste Act, many state legislatures had established regulatory schemes imposing state conditions
on the nuclear industry. In turn, many courts found the state regulations unconstitutional under the doctrine of federal preemption, 7 holding that these regulations were superseded by the Atomic Energy Act of
19548 and its amendments, 9 and that they were obstacles to the federal
goal of encouraging the growth of a nuclear industry.' 0 Other courts
upheld state regulations where it was shown that the purpose of the
regulations was one other than to protect the state from the hazards
associated with radioactive processes and materials."I The existence of
state efforts to control and influence nuclear policy revealed local dissatisfaction with federal nuclear policy. However, the various judicial
interpretations of the Atomic Energy Act created uncertainty as to the
validity of these efforts to control the presence of nuclear facilities and
radioactive materials within their state.
Due to state and local opposition to the prospect of hosting a federal nuclear waste facility, 12 Congress determined that each state must
be responsible for the disposal of one type of radioactive waste generated within its borders. The Low-Level Waste Act' 3 significantly altered the division of state-federal responsibilities with regard to low6. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter
cited as the Low-Level Waste Act].
7. Preemption occurs when "state regulation falls ... because, under the supremacy clause
of Art. VI, the 'supreme' congressional law supersedes or preempts state law. . . . State authority
is barred as well when congressional action is an implicit barrier--e.g., when state regulation
would interfere unduly with the accomplishment of congressional objectives." G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 344 (10th ed. 1980). For a detailed discussion

of the doctrine of federal preemption and its judicial application, see Note, State Regulation of
NuclearPower Production: Facingthe PreemptionChallenge Froma New Perspective,76 Nw. U.L.
REV. 134 (1981).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as the AEA].
9. The AEA was amended in 1959 to clarify the role of the states in nuclear development.
Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 88-489, §§ 5-8, 78 Stat. 603, 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), the functions of the Atomic Energy Commission were divided between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (licensing) and the Energy Research and Development Commission
(research and development of nuclear energy). Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The AEA was also amended by the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. III
1979).
10. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afd
met, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See notes 26 to 43 and accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
See also notes 62-85 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 151-52 and accompanying text infra.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (Supp. IV 1980).

CONGRESSIONAL

RECOGNITION

level radioactive waste materials, or materials contaminated with radioactivity. Congress ceded authority over this type of nuclear material
to the states, in contradistinction to prior findings of exclusive federal
control. 14 It also consented to state burdens on interstate commerce, in
order to insure that the control ceded to the states would be broad
enough to meaningfully regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal. 15
This note will explore the changes made by the Low-Level Waste
Act. It will begin with an analysis of the two approaches developed by
the courts, first, in defining the scope of state power, and, second, in
interpreting federal nuclear policy and objectives. The state-federal
problems which gave rise to the Act as revealed through judicial decisions will be described. Congress' approach to the resolution of the
problems created by the exclusion of the states from decisions regarding the hazards of nuclear technology then will be examined. Finally,
the recent effort of the state of Washington to control the flow of radioactive materials into that state will be analyzed in light of the changing
federal policies.
PREEMPTION OF STATE REGULATIONS

The Atomic Energy Act
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 and its amendments established a comprehensive "program to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense
and security and with the health and safety of the public."1 6 The
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), replaced by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1974, t7 was vested with the responsibility
of overseeing the transition from a federal monopoly over nuclear research and development to privately owned and operated nuclear
power facilities.' The authority granted the AEC, and subsequently
14. Id. at § 2021b(a)(l)(A). See notes 26-61 infra, for a discussion of cases which have held
state regulations concerning nuclear waste or emissions from nuclear plants to be preempted by
federal law.
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021d(a)(2)(A). See also notes 205-43 and accompanying text infra.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1976).
17. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5851 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2013 (1976). "The sole purpose of the 1954 amendments was to relinquish or forfeit ownership and production rights to private enterprise where certain conditions
were met." Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1150 (8th Cir. 1971), afd
mer, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Prior to 1954, the federal government retained complete control over
nuclear materials and technology. "This federal monopoly ended with passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, which allowed private industry to participate for the first time in the development of nuclear power. The 1954 Act authorized private industry to conduct research and build
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the NRC, created "a regulatory scheme which is virtually unique in the
degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administering

agency, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objectives."' 9
Included in the statutory scheme was a set of provisions for "Cooperation with States."' 20 Although the purpose of the section was "to

promote an orderly regulatory pattern between the Commission and
State governments with respect to nuclear development and use and
regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials," 2' both
state and federal courts have struggled with defining the scope of state
and federal authority. Section 2021, which the Low-Level Waste Act
amends,22 consists of fifteen subsections detailing, inter alia, activities
subject to regulation by the state or federal government, 23 a procedure
for "turnover agreements" whereby the governor and the Commission
24
agree to discontinue certain regulatory functions of the Commission,
and notice provisions to insure that state and federal programs will be
"coordinated and compatible." 25
JudicialInterpretation
The leading case addressing the scope of state and federal authorcommercial reactors, under licenses from the AEC." Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Public Serv.
Co. v. United States NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir. 1978).
19. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 771 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
20. Atomic Energy Act of 1959, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
21. Id. § 2021(a)(3) (1976). Under the AEA, the term "byproduct material" means:
(1)any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear material, and (2) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material
content.
Id. § 2014(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The AEA defines "source material" as:
(1)uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission
pursuant to the provisions of section 2091 of this title to be source material; or (2) ores
containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time.
Id. § 2014(z) (1976). "Special nuclear material" is defined as:
(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other
material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 2071 of this title,
determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or
(2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source
material.
Id. § 2014(aa).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (Supp. IV 1980).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b), (c), (i), (k), (m) and (o) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
24. Id. §§ 2021(b), (c), (d), (i) and (j).
25. Id. §§ 2021(e), (g) and (1).
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ity over nuclear facilities under the AEA is Northern States Power Company v. Minnesota.26 In that case, the court held that stringent state
standards limiting the amount of radioactive gaseous discharges a nuclear power plant could emit were preempted by the AEA and federal
regulations. 27 The court rejected the state's arguments that (1) federal
regulation applied to the operation of a nuclear facility, but state authority extended to matters of waste control, 28 and (2) the state police
power over the environment and the health, safety and welfare of its
citizens was concurrent with federal authority in the area of nuclear
regulation.2 9 In support of its holding, the court said that
through direction of the licensing scheme for nuclear reactors, Congress vested the AEC with the authority to resolve the proper balance
between desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety
standards. .

.

. Were the states allowed to impose stricter standards

on the levels of radioactive waste releases discharged from nuclear
power plants, they might conceivably be so overprotective in the area
of health and safety as to unnecessarily stultify the industrial development30 and use of atomic energy for the production of electric
power.
The Northern States opinion was one of the first interpretations of
the section of the AEA dealing with "Cooperation with States."' 3' In
synthesizing the many provisions of that section, the court focused on
two subsections detailing permissible "turnover agreements" 32 despite
26. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). This case has been
described as "undoubtedly the leading case on the issue of federal pre-emption of the field of
nuclear power plant construction and operation." Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 751, 755 (1978). One author has commented that "application of the preemption doctrine in the nuclear area follows in
almost lockstep fashion from the landmark ruling in Northern States, with little regard for any
new or distinguishing factor that might justify a state's exercise of its police power." Moran, On
Preempting State Initiatives Relating to the Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 61 CHI. B. REC. 179, 186
(1979). Another author has stated: "Nuclear energy preemption cases that have reached the
courts subsequent to Northern States have followed the case very closely, especially its reading of
the legislative history." Note, State Regulation ofNuclear Power Production: Facing the Preemption Challenge From a New Perspective, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 134, 156 (1981).
27. 447 F.2d at 1154.
28. Id. at 1145.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1153-54.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Seven years before the Northern States decision, the California Supreme Court had interpreted Section 2021 as reserving to the states the
power to regulate certain aspects of nuclear safety. Northern California Assoc. to Preserve Bodega Head & Harbor, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr.
432 (1964) (In Bank). To the question, "Has the federal government preempted the question of
the safety of the location of atomic reactors?" the court answered simply, "No." Id. at 133, 390
P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The Northern States court did not refer to the California case in
its opinion.
For a discussion of Bodega Head, see notes 66-70 and accompanying text infra.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) states that:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission is authorized to
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the fact that Minnesota had not entered into such an agreement with
the Commission.3 3 Additionally, Section 2021(k), which provides that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of
any state or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than
protection against radiation hazards, '3 4 was read by the court to mean
"that the states possess no authority to regulate radiation hazards unless pursuant to the execution of an agreement surrendering federal

control. '35 By subjecting the effect of section 2021(k) to the existence
of a turnover agreement, the court failed to consider that the section
does not preclude state authority over radiation "activities" if the
state's purpose is unrelated to protecting against the dangers of

radioactivity.

36

The Northern States court failed to inquire into the purpose of the
Minnesota pollution control regulations, as required by section 2021 (k).
enter into agreements with the Governor of any State providing for discontinuance of
the regulatory authority. . with respect to any one or more of the following materials
within the State-(l) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(1) of this title;
(2) byproduct materials as defined in section 2014(e)(2) of this title; (3) source materials;
(4) special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass. During
the duration of such agreement it is recognized that the State shall have authority to
regulate materials covered by the agreement for the protection of the public health and
safety from radiation hazards.
Section 2021(c) reads:
(c) No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall provide for
discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of (I) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility;
(2) the export from or import into the United States of byproduct, source, or special
nuclear material, or of any production or utilization facility;
(3) the disposal into the ocean or sea of byproduct, source, or special nuclear waste
materials as defined in regulations or orders of the Commission;
(4) the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials as the
Commission determines by regulation or order should, because of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be so disposed of without a license from the Commission.
The Commission shall also retain authority under any such agreement to make a determination that all applicable standards and requirements have been met prior to termination of a license for byproduct material, as defined in section 2014(e)(2) of this title.
Notwithstanding any agreement between the Commission and any State pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section, the Commission is authorized by rule, regulation, or order
to require that the manufacturer, processor, or producer of any equipment, device, commodity, or other product containing source, byproduct, or special nuclear material shall
not transfer possession or control of such product except pursuant to a license issued by
the Commission.
33. 447 F.2d at 1148-49.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
35. 447 F.2d at 1149-50.
36. Turnover agreements involve the discontinuance of Commission authority, and are regulated under statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) & (c) (1976 & Supp. Il 1979). For the text of these
sections see note 32 supra. When Commission authority is not relinquished, "[tihere is nothing in
the statutes which expresses a clear Congressional intent to prohibit the states from taking additional reasonable steps deemed necessary to control air, water and land pollution whether the
pollution be by radiation or otherwise." 447 F.2d at 1157 (Van Oosterhout, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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It observed that the "regulation of the radioactive effluents discharged
from a nuclear power plant is inextricably intertwined with the planning, construction and entire operation of the facility. ' 37 Because the
state laws would affect the construction and operation of the plant, and
the AEC was prohibited from relinquishing control over the construction and operation of nuclear plants under a turnover agreement,3 8 the
state regulations were held preempted. Congress did not intend, in the
court's view, "to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent
jurisdiction by States to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source, or special nuclear materials. ' 39 Furthermore, the
court said that the Minnesota emission standards were an attempt to
regulate radiation hazards and thus were impermissible under section
2021(k) as well, regardless of Minnesota's purpose in establishing those
standards. 40
In addition to interpreting section 2021, the court's opinion contained broad statements of federal nuclear policy and the perceived intent of state regulation. The court said that the AEA "evince[s] a
legislative design to foster and encourage the development, use and
control of atomic energy so as to make the maximum contribution to
the general welfare and to increase the standard of living."'4 ' This federal goal to promote the use of atomic energy required that state action
which impeded that goal must be held invalid under the Supremacy
Clause. 4 2 Furthermore, the court found that Congress had "inescapably" implied that the federal government was to retain exclusive authority over nuclear development, absent a grant of power to a state in
43
a turnover agreement.
Relying on the strong policy statements on the question of federal
preemption in Northern States, other courts sustained challenges to
state regulation or action concerning emissions from nuclear plants.
For example, an Illinois appellate court" in a shortper curiam opinion,
held that portions of the state Environmental Control Act were uncon37. Id. at 1153.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. 111 1979). See note 32 supra, for the text of this
section.
39. 447 F.2d at 1149.
40. Id. at 1150-52.
41. Id.at 1153.
42. Id. at 1154. See text accompanying note 30 supra, for the court's reasoning in concluding
that state regulation was incompatible with the AEA and thus preempted.
43. 447 F.2d at 1150.
44. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 IIl. App. 3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342
(1972). Referring to the Northern States opinion, the court said: "The affirmance of the Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision by the United States Supreme Court in our opinion is conclusive of the
issue presented on this appeal and the only conclusion is that state control and regulation has been
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stitutional under Northern States. In New Jersey, the state supreme
court held that the state Department of Environmental Protection

could not recover damages from a nuclear power company for the
death of 500,000 pounds of fish 45 allegedly caused by the emergency
discharge of cold water into a stream because the discharge was part of
the company's radioactive waste disposal system.4 6 The New Jersey

court noted that the discharge had been authorized by the AEC and
that "AEC regulations prohibited [the power company] from operating
in any other manner. . . . Interference by the State, whether by statutory penalty, injunction or monetary damages . . . is not permissible."' 47 The court acknowledged that section 2021(k) reserved power
over non-radiation hazards to the state, but held that under Northern
States, the subject matter of radioactive emissions was preempted by
the AEA.

48

Recently, several federal district courts invalidated state schemes
concerning nuclear waste disposal facilities without addressing the distinction between state action directed at regulating the level of radioactive discharges "from the standpoint of radiological health and
safety" 49 and state action for "purposes other than protection against
radiation hazards." 50 In two separate actions, 5 1 Illinois federal district
courts granted summary judgment to operators of waste facilities on
the ground that, under Northern States, "the NRC has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to radiation hazards. '5 2 In Illinois v. KerrMcGee Chemical Corp., the state of Illinois and a municipality sought
to prosecute a waste disposal operator for violation of Illinois public
nuisance, pollution and refuse disposal laws. 53 The other action 54 inpreempted by the statutes of the United States." Id. at 801, 284 N.E.2d at 342. The Illinois case
was decided two months after the Supreme Court affirmed Northern States without an opinion.
45. New Jersey Dep't. of Envir. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 133 N.J.
Super. 375, 382, 336 A.2d 750, 753 (1975), rev'd 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
46. New Jersey Dep't. of Envir. Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102,
351 A.2d 337 (1976).
47. Id. at 115, 351 A.2d at 344.
48. Id. at 112-13, 351 A.2d at 343.
49. See 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1981).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
51. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., No. 80 C 2776 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1981), rev'd and
remanded, 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982). See note 53 infra. General Elec. Co. v. Fahner, No. 80 C
6835 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 12, 1981), aft'd in part, 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982).
52. Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., No. 80 C 2776, slip op. at 3.
53. Id. The disposal site was located near the city of West Chicago, which alleged that its
operation constituted a nuisance. The city sought injunctive relief. The district court rejected the
city's argument that the relief sought was not barred by federal preemption because the AEA did
not extend to "municipal regulation of non-radiological health, safety and welfare violations." Id.
at 2-3.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed the district
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volved a challenge to the Illinois Spent Fuel Act, which subjected the
importation of radioactive wastes and the operators of waste facilities
to certain state conditions.5 5 Two California cases 5 6 involved challenges to the California Nuclear Laws, one of which imposed a moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants until a permanent
method of radioactive waste disposal is found. 57 Both of the district
courts found the laws unconstitutional, but were reversed on appeal to
the Ninth Circuit, which found that the laws were enacted for eco-

nomic and environmental purposes, and therefore not preempted
under section 2021(k). 58 In the state of Washington, a federal district
court 59 held that an initiative passed by the voters to bar the importacourt's ruling. 677 F.2d 571 (1982). The court, relying on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Paciftc Legal Found v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n., 659 F.2d 903 (1981), held that "[regulation of non-radiation hazards by the states or
their political subdivisions has not . . . been preempted." 677 F.2d at 581. The court remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of whether the city sought to regulate radiation or
non-radiation hazards. Id. at 584.
54. General Elec. Co. v. Fahner, No. 80 C 6835 (N.D. 111.Oct. 12, 1981), aff'd in part, 683
F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982). In recently affirming the district court's decision on the merits, the court
held that the Illinois Spent Fuel Act, (see note 55 infra) violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and was preempted under the Supremacy Clause. 683 F.2d at
213-14. This decision comports with federal nuclear policy in that the Illinois statute purported to
regulate high-level radioactive waste, which is not covered by the Low-Level Waste Act. See
notes 177 and 206 and accompanying text infra.
The court reversed the district court's decision in a consolidated suit, Illinois v. General Electric Co., No. 81 C 0461 (N.D. I11.Oct. 12, 1981), on the procedural matter of whether the enforcement action brought by the state in state court was properly removed to federal court. The court
found that the removal was improper. 683 F.2d at 208. Since the court reached the merits in one
suit, the outcome of the state litigation will most likely follow the federal court's decision.
55. I11.Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 111 , 230.22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). The statute prohibits
the disposal and storage of spent nuclear fuel, which is high-level radioactive waste, unless it was
generated within the state, or the state in which it was produced also provides facilities for radioactive waste disposal and has a reciprocity agreement for disposal with Illinois.
56. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F.
Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), and Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 903
(9th Cir. 1981).
57. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25524.2 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980) provides in part:
No nuclear fission thermal powerplant. . . shall be permitted land use in the state, .
until both conditions (a) and (b) have been met:
(a) The commission finds that there has been developed and that the United States
through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology
or means for the disposal of high level nuclear waste.
(b) The commission has reported its findings and the reasons therefor . . . to the
Legislature.
Another California law prohibits the certification of any nuclear plant until the state energy commission submits a study on "berm containment," or underground foundation safety, to the legislature. Id. at § 25524.3. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 907-09 (9th Cir. 1981).
58. Id. at 923-26.
59. Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928, 931
(E.D. Wash. 1981), ajj'd, 684 F.2d 627 (1982).
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tion of certain radioactive wastes was unconstitutional because "Congress intended that the transportation and storage of all materials
which pose radiation hazards would be regulated by the federal gov6
ernment except when jurisdiction was expressly ceded to the states,"
and because the ban was an impermissible burden on interstate
6
commerce. '
In a separate line of cases, where the courts have examined the
purposes of the state action at issue, they have been less willing to conclude that any action concerning waste or discharge from a nuclear facility is preempted. In Paqfic Legal Foundation v. State Resources
Conservation and Development Commission, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reviewed two district court cases which had concluded that California's Nuclear Laws were unconstitutional. 62 The
court found that the state legislature was motivated by economic and
environmental concerns in banning the further construction and operation of nuclear power plants until a permanent method of radioactive
waste disposal was found. 63 Rejecting the notion that safety and protection against radiation hazards were the purposes of the Nuclear
Laws, the court found that "the lack of a federally approved method of
waste disposal created a 'clog' in the nuclear fuel cycle; more wastes
were continually being produced, storage space was limited, and no
permanent means of disposal was available. . . . The costs of nuclear
power were escalating sharply, and. . . increasing disappointments in
portions of the fuel cycle were a contributing factor." 64 Given the uncertainty regarding permanent disposal of radioactive materials, the
court found that California could reasonably conclude that nuclear
power sources were uneconomical. "The legislature has chosen to
mandate reliance upon other energy sources until these uncertainties
. . .are resolved. We find that such a choice is expressly authorized
'65
under sections 271 and 274(k) of the Atomic Energy Act."
This holding is consistent with an early California Supreme Court
decision, in which the court stated that section 2021 of the AEA did not
60. 518 F. Supp. at 933-35.
61. See notes 196-234 and accompanying text iffra.
62. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'g Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 699 (E.D. Cal. 1980), and Pacific Legal Found. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comnm'n, 472 F. Supp. 191 (S.D. Cal. 1979). See
note 57 supra, for the text of the California Nuclear Laws.
63. 659 F.2d at 923-26 (9th Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 924. In enacting its nuclear laws, the California Assembly found that both industry
and government representatives, and critics of nuclear energy "stipulated" that the absence of a
federally approved method for radioactive waste disposal was a major problem. d.
65. Id. at 925. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2018 and 2021(k) (1976).
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preempt state efforts to regulate the location of a nuclear plant. In
Northern CaliforniaAssociation to PreserveBodega HeadandHarborv.
Public Utilities Commission,66 the court drew a distinction between radiation hazards regulated by the federal government and non-radiation
hazards left to state control under section 2021(k). It said:
[Sjince the location of an atomic reactor at or near an active earthquake fault zone involves safety considerations in addition to radiation hazards, it is clear that the federal government has not
preempted the field, at least with respect to the phase of protecting
the public from hazards other than radiation hazards, and that the
states' powers in determining the location of atomic reactors are not
limited67to matters of zoning or similar local interests other than
safety.
The court was reviewing the refusal of the state Public Utilities Commission to reopen hearings on the certification of a nuclear reactor to
be built near the San Andreas Fault. 68 Certain commissioners had indicated that their decision was based on the existence of federal authority over nuclear power plant operations and on the notion that federal
review would be adequate. The court rejected this as a basis for refusing to reconsider the petitioner's claims, stating that the state commissions had the independent authority to consider non-radiation hazards
to the public. 69 It affirmed the commission's decision nevertheless, because the petitioner had failed to appeal the decision within the statu70
tory time frame.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in a case brought by a state resident alleging that a nuclear power plant's cooling system constituted a
nuisance by creating fogging and icing, held that these effects were not
radiation hazards and thus were proper subjects for state regulation. 7'
The court pointed out that "the Atomic Energy Act, in § 2021(k), specifically allowed state regulation of nonradiation hazards, ' 72 and that
"[hiere a finding of nonradiological nuisance would not impinge on
AEC regulation of radiation hazards."'73
A Missouri appellate court, 74 while acknowledging that the federal
66. 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964) (In Bank).
67. Id. at 133, 390 P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
68. Id. at 130 n.2, 390 P.2d at 20 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 434 n.2.
69. Id. at 133, 390 P.2d at 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
70. Id. at 133-36, 390 P.2d at 206-07, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
71. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975).
72. Id. at 262, 237 N.W.2d at 282.
73. Id., 237 N.W.2d at 281.
74. State ex rel Utility Consumers Council v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct.
App.), ceri. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
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government preempted state authority to determine the safety of a nuclear facility, defined the scope of state and federal power as follows:
The federal regulations pertain to plans, specifications, safety mechanisms and the like. The [state] Commission's considerations pertain
to economic feasibility, need for power and financing. It is obvious
that the considerations of the State of Missouri do not affect the control of how the nuclear facility will be constructed and physically
maintained. The considerations of the Commission do not attempt
75
to protect the citizens of Missouri against radiation hazards.
In New Jersey, the Superior Court, Law Division, dismissed various tort claims against a power company for damages caused by the
infestation of shipworms attracted to plaintiffs' property by the warm,
saline water discharged from the company's radioactive waste cooling
system. 76 The court said that the effort to recover money damages
"constitute[d] at least an indirect interference with the defendant's
radwaste discharge system," and therefore was preempted by federal
law. 77 However, it let stand a claim for compensation for inverse condemnation because that right depends on state, not federal, law, and
78
does not involve radiation hazards, either directly or indirectly.
These courts expressed views of federal nuclear objectives which
contrast sharply with the Northern States conception of encouragement
and promotion.79 The Missouri court stated that "[tihe federal government regulates how nuclear plants will be constructed and maintained;
the State of Missouri regulates whether they will be constructed." 80 In
minimizing possible conflict between state and federal objectives,8 ' the
Michigan court pointed out that, "most importantly, the license granted
75. Id. at 698.
76. Van Dissel v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 152 N.J. Super. 391, 377 A.2d 1244 (1977).
77. Id. at 403, 377 A.2d at 1250. The court referred to the plant's radioactive waste cooling
and discharge system as its "radwaste" system. Id.
78. Id. at 412, 377 A.2d at 1254. The court described inverse condemnation as a remedy
designed to protect a landowner from a defacto taking of private property by either the sovereign
or by another "clothed with the sovereign's power." Id. at 403, 377 A.2d at 1250.
79. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra. The court in Northern Slates quoted a
commentator to point out that "It]he Commission's licensing system is but a part of an intensive
program to promote the public and private development and utilization of atomic energy." 447
F.2d at 1153 (quoting STASON, ESTEP & PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW (1954)).

80. State ex rel Utility Consumers Council v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 688, 698 (Mo.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978).
81. Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 259, 237 N.W.2d 266, 280-81
(1975). Quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960), the Michigan
court reiterated the Supreme Court's admonition that courts must not "[seek] out conflicts between
state and federal regulations where none clearly exist." 65 Mich. App. at 260, 237 N.W.2d at 281
(emphasis added). In Huron PortlandCement Co. v. Detroit, the Court upheld the application of
Detroit's stringent smoke emission standards to ships which traveled on interstate waters despite
the existence of federal regulations governing aspects of the ships' construction and operation. 362
U.S. at 442.
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by the AEC is merely a permit to construct a power plant, not a Federal order to do so. Therefore, a state which. . . stopped a power company from operating until it met reasonable state standards or abated a
nuisance under state law could not be frustrating a Federal mandate."' 82 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, more emphatically stated
that "Congress has not 'unmistakably. . .ordained' a goal of promoting nuclear power, but has instead regarded nuclear power as one option which the states may choose."'8 3 By enacting the Atomic Energy
Act, Congress "struck a balance between state and federal power to
regulate. Inherent in the states' regulatory authority is the power to
keep nuclear plants from being built, if the plants are inconsistent with
the states' power needs, or environmental or other interests."'8 4 The
court recognized that regulation of nuclear power essentially represents
policy decisions which will determine the future responsibilities of local
as well as of the federal government. Quoting the United States
Supreme Court, it said that "[tjime may prove wrong the decision to
develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States within their
85
appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgment.
California made its decision, and the court respected and upheld its
choice.
In summary, the Northern States decision has been interpreted to
stand for the proposition that state efforts to regulate or otherwise affect
radioactive waste disposal or emissions are preempted by the AEC jurisdiction over the operation and construction of nuclear power plants.
The federal nuclear policy was perceived as one encouraging the use of
nuclear power, and state action which curtailed or inhibited the use of
nuclear facilities was preempted because it obstructed federal objectives. A second line of reasoning has developed, articulated most recently by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Legal
Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission.86 The courts subscribing to this second approach recognize that the purpose of state regulation which affects radioactive discharge or waste systems is the controlling factor in determining
whether the action is permissible under the AEA. These cases view the
82. 65 Mich. App. at 259, 237 N.W.2d at 280.
83. Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d
903, 928 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 926. See note 30 and accompanying text supra, for the contrasting approach of the
Northern States court to the possibility of state obstacles to nuclear development.
85. Id. at 928 (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
86. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Commission as a licensing agency insuring the technical integrity of
nuclear facilities, but reserve to the states the ultimate decision on
whether a nuclear power facility is appropriate and should be built.
STATE PARTICIPATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Under either of the above approaches to the preemption question,
the states are precluded from directly acting to regulate for protection
against radiation hazards. As the California legislature recognized,
however, in passing the Nuclear Laws and in imposing a moratorium
on the construction of nuclear plants,8 7 a method of permanent disposal of radioactive wastes does not exist.8 8 The NRC has had to deal
with both the practical problems arising from the shortage of on-site
commercial storage space8 9 and the policy questions regarding whether
operating or disposal licenses should be issued or amended given the
continuing uncertainty over disposal methods. 90 As will be shown, the
states have had little success in influencing the NRC's decisions on

these issues.
Under the AEA, section 189, the NRC "shall grant a hearing upon
the request of any person whose interest may be affected" by a proceed87. See note 57 supra.
88. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
89. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the nuclear fuel cycle and
the problems arising from an accumulation of waste materials as follows:
A nuclear reactor core contains a number of fuel assemblies, bundles of thin tubes (or
"fuel rods") containing pellets of enriched uranium. The build-up of neutron-absorbing
"poisons" during the chain reaction reduces the ability of the fuel to sustain an efficient
chain reaction. "Spent" fuel assemblies must therefore be removed periodically from the
reactor core and replaced with fresh fuel. When removed from the core, the assemblies
generate enormous heat and contain highly radioactive uranium, actinides and plutonium. Under current practice, the assemblies are placed vertically on racks in a "spent
fuel pool" adjacent to the reactor within the containment vessel ...
It was anticipated, when most of the nuclear power plants now in operation in the
United States were licensed, that spent fuel would be stored at the reactor site only long
enough to allow the fuel assemblies to cool sufficiently to permit safe shipment off-site
for reprocessing (the extraction from the rods of usable uranium and plutonium) or permanent disposal. Spent fuel storage capacity at these plants is therefore limited.
Plans for off-site reprocessing or storage have not materialized. . . . The availability of off-site storage facilities, not involving reprocessing, is limited, and no additional
capacity is currently projected.
Minnesota v. United States NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 413-14 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 528 n.6
(1978); Illinois v. United States NRC, 591 F.2d 12, 13 n.l (7th Cir. 1979); Lower Alloways Creek
Twp. v. United States NRC, 481 F. Supp. 443, 445 (D.N.J. 1979); Seiberling, Radioactive Waste
Disposal- The Emerging Issue of States' Rights, 13 AKRON L. REV. 261, 263 (1979).
90. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States NRC, 598 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978); and cases
cited in note 89 supra.
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ing commenced to obtain or amend a license from the NRC. 9 1 Pursuant to this section, the state of Illinois sought a review of a NRC license
92
issued to General Electric for the operation of a "fuel recovery plant"
in Illinois v. United States NRC.9 3 The state argued that because
(1) reprocessing, or fuel recovery, had been indefinitely postponed by
the federal government 94 and (2) the technology for reprocessing did
not exist, the General Electric site was in fact a long-term storage facility, and should be licensed as such. 95 The NRC had refused to reexamine the status of the plant and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed its decision, holding that the state could not compel the NRC to hear its concerns. 96 The NRC was required to hold
hearings "only after a formal proceeding has already begun. . . . As
there was no proceeding in this case and as the Act contains no provision for a hearing when no proceeding has been commenced under this
'9 7
section, the state is clearly without a right to a hearing."
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The statute reads in relevant part:
(a) In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or
amending of any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control, ...
dealing with the activities of licensees ...the Commission shall grant a hearing upon
the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding .... In
cases where such a construction permit has been issued following the holding of such a
hearing, the Commission may, in the absence of a request therefor by any person whose
interest may be affected, issue an operating license or an amendment to a construction
permit or an amendment to an operating license without a hearing, but upon thirty days'
notice and publication once in the Federal Register of its intent to do so. The Commission may dispense with such thirty days' notice and publication with respect to any application for an amendment ... upon a determination by the Commission that the
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
92. A fuel recovery plant would "reprocess" radioactive waste, or separate elements of uranium and plutonium from spent fuel and fabricate it into new, mixed oxide nuclear fuel. See
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States NRC, 598 F.2d 759, 762 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979).
93. 591 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1979).
94. Id. at 16. In 1977, President Carter declared that his administration would "defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power
programs." Statement by the President on Nuclear Power Policy, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.

Doc. 502, 503 (1977). The NRC accordingly placed a two year moratorium on proceedings for
reprocessing licenses, and that action was upheld in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States
NRC, 598 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. 591 F.2d at 16.
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. But see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States NRC, 606 F.2d
1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1979), where the court found that an NRC decision not to license temporary
radioactive waste storage tanks was a final order reviewable by the court of appeals. "Since a
licensing jurisdiction determination is a necessary first step in any proceeding for the granting of a
license, we hold that the NRC's decision was 'entered in a proceeding' for 'the granting ...of any
license'."

See also Sholly v. United States NRC, 651 F.2d 780, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.granted 101 S.
Ct. 3004 (1981), in which the court held that the NRC could not dispense with a requested hearing
on a change in an operating license under 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note
91 supra, for the text of the statute. In that case, the NRC had concluded that "no significant
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In Minnesota v. United States NRC,9 8 the NRC had commenced
proceedings to amend the operating license of the Northern States
Power Company "to permit the expansion of on-site capacity for the
storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies." 99 The state of Minnesota intervened and raised the same questions that Illinois had attempted to
compel the NRC to address.' °° Minnesota contended that the uncertainty as to the feasibility of permanent disposal of radioactive wastes
raised the possibility that the power plant's "temporary storage" would
become a long-term storage site. Therefore, the NRC should consider
the "safety and environmental implications of indefinite storage onsite" in the proceedings.' 0 ' The Commission refused to consider the
state's concerns and "premised its denial on its 'reasonable confidence'
10 2
that wastes can and will in due course be disposed of safely."'
In its review of the Commission's action, the court noted that "[n]o
one disputes that solutions to the commercial waste dilemma are not
currently available."' 0 3 The court, nonetheless, upheld the Commission's decision not to consider the issue of waste disposal at each hearing to license or amend a license. °4 The NRC could resolve the
"complex issue of nuclear waste disposal in a 'generic' proceeding"' 10 5
because "[tihe breadth of the questions involved and the fact that the
ultimate determination can never rise above a prediction suggest that
the determination may be a kind of legislative judgment for which
rulemaking would suffice."' 1 6 The state had argued that such a "generic" proceeding, with the adopted policy decision then applied uniformly,' 0 7 would "deprive it of procedures such as cross-examination,
to test the evidence.' 108 In response to this argument, the court rehazards" were involved in the venting of radioactive gas from the disabled Three Mile Island
reactor, and that, therefore, a hearing had not been necessary. 651 F.2d at 783.
98. 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
99. Id. at 413.
100. See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra.
101. 602 F.2d at 415.
102. Id. See 42 Fed. Reg. 34,393-94 (1977), for the NRC's statement of policy on waste
disposal.
103. 602 F.2d at 416. See also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
NRC, 582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978).
104. 602 F.2d at 416. See also Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. United States NRC,
582 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1978), wherein the plaintiff sought to compel the NRC to find, as a matter of
policy, that the absence of an adequate method of permanent or long-term waste disposal made
the further licensing of nuclear plants a danger to the public.
105. 602 F.2d at 416.
106. Id. at 417.
107. Id. Once the NRC adopted a policy regarding the expansion of radioactive waste storage

facilities, it could "then apply its determination in subsequent adjudicatory proceedings." Id. at
416.
108. Id. at 417.
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manded the case to the NRC, which was at the time holding rulemaking hearings on the issue of permanent waste disposal, 0 9 for NRC
0
consideration of the state's concerns."1
Similar arguments were discussed by the court in Lower Alloways
Creek Township v. United States NRC,"' in which a local government
brought suit in federal district court to prevent the NRC from expanding the waste storage capacity of a New Jersey power plant. The
township alleged that the NRC had refused to consider its concerns
about radiological hazards associated with the storage of large amounts
of radioactive materials" 12 and that the NRC proceedings were inadequate."1 3 The court dismissed the action, directing the township to exhaust its administrative remedies within the NRC, 14 but it reserved
jurisdiction in the event that the NRC attempted to give immediate
effect to a decision adverse to the township before administrative and
judicial review were complete." 15
Barred from directly regulating radioactive hazards, the state and
local governments in Illinois, Minnesota and New Jersey attempted to
influence federal actions relating to radioactive wastes within the
NRC's administrative structure." 6 Dissatisfied with the NRC's treatment of their concerns, the states appealed to the courts in an effort to
compel the NRC to hear their concerns. However, because judicial re7 the states obtained
view of administrative hearings is limited, 11
little, if
any relief from the federal courts. Congress, however, remained an
arena for airing state concerns surrounding radioactive hazards.
109. "[T]here is now pending before the Commission a related generic proceeding---the socalled 'S-3' proceeding, in which the issues of the storage and disposal of commercial nuclear
wastes are of central concern. Id. See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(e) (1981) for a description of this
proceeding.
110. 602 F.2d at 418.
111. 481 F. Supp. 443 (D.N.J. 1979).
112. Id. at 449.
113. Id. at 451.
114. Id. at 454.
115. Id. The NRC regulations provide for the immediate effectiveness of orders amending a
license or permit. 10 C.F.R. § 2.764(a) (1981). The court reserved jurisdiction in the event that
the NRC attempted to give its order immediate effect, so that the township's access to judicial
review would not be rendered futile. 481 F. Supp. at 454.
116. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afdmer.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 111.App. 3d 800, 284
N.E.2d 342 (1972); and New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power &
Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976).
117. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978), in which the Court held, "Administrative decisions should be set

aside. . . only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons.
is unhappy with the result reached." Id. at 558.

not simply because the court
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FROM THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT TO THE LoW-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACT: AN ADJUSTMENT OF
FEDERAL-STATE RESPONSIBILITIES

Congress has repeatedly considered the problem of radioactive
waste disposal,"18 and in 1980 the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources introduced a comprehensive "Nuclear Waste Policy
Act" in the Senate." 9 This bill and the Committee report accompanying it20 bear little resemblance to the Low-Level Waste Act' 2' which
was ultimately adopted by Congress. The transformation which occurred on the floor of Congress indicates the range of concerns raised
by the problem of radioactive waste disposal. It also reveals that "the
technical problems with nuclear waste are no more severe than the
practical political problems involving our States and the people within
22
them." 1
Originally the Nuclear Waste Policy Act called for the establishment of a federal program whereby ownership of commercial radioactive waste 23 would be transferred to the United States Department of
Energy for permanent management and storage. 24 The cornerstone of
the Committee's bill was a provision for the construction of "Away
from Reactor" storage. 25 A site for the facility to house this waste was
118. Congress is currently considering additional legislation in an effort to establish national
leadership in resolving the nuclear waste disposal crisis. At least five House bills have been
drafted and one bill has surfaced in the Senate, but passage of any one bill is considered unlikely
this session. 12 Envir. Rep. (BNA) 694-96 (1981).
For a history of congressional review of the question of radioactive waste disposal since 1959,
see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States NRC, 582 F.2d 166, 170 n.8 (2d Cir.
1978).
119. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See 126 CONG. REC. S9970 (daily ed. July 28, 1980).
120. S.Rep., note 2 supra, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6933. The report
was prepared by the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and in no way describes the LowLevel Waste Act, which was passed in its stead. It does, however, reflect the concerns of the
committee members and the situation which gave rise to the bill.
121. Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (Supp. IV 1980).
122. 126 CONG. REC. S10003 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Domenici). See id at
S9988 (remarks of Sen. Cochran) and S. Rep., note 2 supra, at 30, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 6953-54.
123. The bill was to cover nuclear waste from civilian activities, including waste from nuclear
power plants. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1980). See 126 CONG. REC. S9970 (daily ed.
July 28, 1980); S.Rep., note 2 supra, at 18, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at

6941. The Low-Level Waste Act also applies to civilian waste only, excluding federally produced
waste in §§ 3 & 4 of the bill. Low-Level Waste Act §§ 3 & 4,42 U.S.C. §§ 202lb-2021d (Supp. IV
1980).
124. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 401 & 402 (1980). See S. Rep., note 2 srupra, at 20,
reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6944.
125. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., tits. III & IV (1980). The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee reported that it "recognizes that existing onsite storage facilities have been
designed for temporary storage of spent fuel only. This fact, and the Administration policy decision to defer the licensing of facilities for the reprocessing of spent fuel, makes the construction of
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to be proposed by the Secretary of the Department of Energy within
one year of the bill's passage, and its completion was projected for the
mid-1980s.' 26 "[T]he temporary storage of spent fuel at individual
powerplant storage pools [was] to be maximized, and the Secretary of
Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other appropriate
agencies [were] to encourage and expedite the use of available storage
at these sites consistent with certain conditions."'' 27 Much of the bill
focused on the technical aspects of implementing the plan for federal
28
ownership and storage.'
The authors of the Committee's bill accepted federal responsibility
for the waste disposal crisis facing the nuclear industry, 29 and intended

the Department of Energy and the NRC to be ultimately responsible
for waste disposal. 3 0 According to the Committee's bill, the role of the
federal government was to be expanded to include ownership and management of both federally produced and commercially produced radioactive waste.' 3 ' The role of the states, by contrast, was not mentioned,
except in the Supplemental Views of Senators Hatfield 32 and
Domenici. 3 3 Senator Domenici advocated the establishment of a
"process whereby states could 'consult and concur' on the creation of
nuclear waste facilities,"' 3 4 and criticized the bill as "totally unsatisfactory" should no provision for state involvement in siting and protection
of the public be included. 135
In both the Committee Report136 and on the floor of the Senate,137
additional spent fuel storage facilities inevitable." S. Rep., note 2 supra, at 18, reprintedin [1980]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6941.

126. Id. at 12, reprinted in [19801 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6935.
127. Id. at 15, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6939. This position contrasts sharply with that of Minnesota, in Minnesota v. United States NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir.
1979), that of Illinois, in Illinois v. United States NRC, 591 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1979) and that of a
New Jersey township, in Lower Alloways Creek Twp. v. United States NRC, 481 F. Supp. 443
(D.N.J. 1979), where the governments sought to prevent the expansion of storage space in existing
power plant facilities. See notes 93-115 and accompanying text supra.
128. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., tits. III, IV & V (1980). See S. Rep., note 2 supra, at 18-23,
reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6941-46.
129. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 101 (1980). See S. Rep., note 2 supra, at 17, reprintedin
[1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6941.

130. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. IV (1980). See S. Rep., note 2 supra, at 20-23, reprinted
in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6944-46.

131. S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., tit. III (1980). See S. Rep., note 2supra, at 18-20, reprinted
in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6941.

132. S.Rep., note 2 supra at 29, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6952.
133. Id. at 30, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6953.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 11-12, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6934-35.
137. 126 CONG. REC. S9973 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. McClure). Commenting on the House version of the bill, Rep. Dingell said:
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a sense of the urgency of the radioactive waste disposal crisis was expressed. Recurring questions of safety and of state involvement in the
disposal decisions, however, surrounded and indeed displaced discussion of the more technical aspects of implementing the plan for federal
control. The bill's sponsor asserted that radioactive waste could be"
safely stored and disposed of,' 38 while other Senators insisted that the
139 or "still does not exist."'' 4
technology was "at best rudimentary"'
Against this backdrop, the question of federal-state relations in the
nuclear field was debated. Several amendments were introduced to insure that the states would be involved in any action taken by the federal government regarding the location or operation of a disposal

facility.

41

As he had promised, Senator Domenici introduced an

amendment requiring the Department of Energy to "consult and concur" with the states before proposing a site to Congress, and after extensive debate, the amendment was adopted by the Senate. 42 In
explaining the motive behind a similar amendment, a sponsor said:
"Because of the unfortunate history of State-Federal relations in this
area, States today view Federal nuclear waste programs with extreme
distrust and many States have taken action, in fact, to block any Federal activities within their borders which might lead to the development
of permanent waste disposal facilities."' 43 It was hoped that through
"the amount of waste is growing. The peril is here. The need to resolve the problem is
present and I call upon my colleagues to have a keen knowledge that whether you are for
nuclear power or not, the question of the storage of this waste lies strongly upon our
backs."
126 CONG. REC. H11767 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
138. "After 500 to 600 years there is no gamma radiation at all, and as one distinguished
scientist put it, after that period of time you could eat your lunch on top of the waste and there
would be no problem. I do not recommend that, but that is what he said." 126 CONG. REc. S9971
(daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Johnston).
139. Id. at S9975 (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
140. Id. at S9976 (remarks of Sen. Hart).
141. The Percy-Glenn amendment, S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., amend. 1449, 126 CoNG.
REC. S9981 (daily ed. July 28, 1980), introduced by Sen. Domenici, was to provide "a sure and
certain mechanism for addressing the competing interests of the State and the Federal Government" by involving states in the Department of Energy's studies on proposed facility sites. Id. at
S9985 (remarks of Sen. Glenn).
Another amendment, S.2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., amend. 1454, 126 CONG. REc. S10060
(daily ed. July 29, 1980), was introduced "to provide consultation with State officials with respect
to siting of temporary, away-from-reactor storage of civilian nuclear powerplant wastes." Id. (emphasis added).
142. 126 CONG. REC. S10009 (daily ed. July 28, 1980). Amend. 1449 was adopted unanimously by 83 votes, with 17 Senators not voting.
143. Id. at S9985 (daily ed. July 28, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Glenn). In the House, Rep. Markey of Massachusetts explained, "The reason that we need that rule [for state participation] is that
the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies have had a miserable record in implementing any kind of nuclear waste program." Id. at H 11764 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
See also Seiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposal- The Emerging Issue of States' Rights, 13
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"consultation and concurrence" this distrust could be assuaged.
The amendment that later became the Low-Level Waste Act was

introduced by Senators Thurmond and Hollings, both of South Carolina. t44 It provided that the policy of the federal government would be
that each state is responsible for the disposal of low-level radioactive
waste generated within its borders. 145 Low-level waste is any material
contaminated by or exposed to radioactivity, and includes water, work

clothes and equipment. 146 It is produced in the medical use of radioactive isotopes to diagnose disease, in research laboratories, and, in small

amounts, in nuclear power plant cooling systems.14 7
The low-level waste amendment presented a new approach to the
problem of the shortage of disposal facilities. 48 Perhaps because the
technology for low-level waste disposal is "well-understood," 49 and
therefore requires little federal technical assistance, Congress could as a
practical matter delegate this responsibility to the states. 5 0o But aside
AKRON L. REV. 261, 263-64 (1979) where Rep. John Seiberling of Ohio described the federal
efforts to establish disposal facilities in the state of Washington. At the Hanover Reservation,
unexpected, and, for a period of months, undetected leaks resulted in the loss of 423,500 gallons of
highly radioactive wastes, which were absorbed into the ground.
144. S.2189, amend. 1453, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S10057 (daily ed. July 29,
1980).
145. Sen. Thurmond was not shy in explaining the motivation behind his amendment: "I
suppose one might say that the matter of low-level waste disposal is no immediate problem, unless
one lives in or represents, as we do, one of the three States serving as a 'dumping ground' for the
rest of the Nation." 126 CONG. REc. S10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980). But see S. Rep., note 2
supra, at 14-15, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6938, for more general
concern over low-level nuclear waste disposal. In the House, Rep. Dingell of Michigan said:
"The Low-Level waste issue is the most immediate problem confronting us, and it is essential that
the Congress act expeditiously on this matter if we are to avoid an impending crisis." 126 Cong.
Rec. HI 1765 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
146. The Low-Level Waste Act defines low-level radioactive waste by exclusion:
The term "low-level radioactive waste" means radioactive waste not classified as highlevel radioactive waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material as
defined in section 1le(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Low-Level Waste Act, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
147. S.Rep., note 2 supra, at 15, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6938.
148. Low-level radioactive wastes do not present exactly the same problems as high-level,
spent-fuel wastes, which are stored "temporarily" at nuclear reactor sites. See note 89 supra.
Nevertheless, commercial low-level waste disposal sites have come under "increased criticism"
and of the six facilities in operation in the 1960s, only two are presently accepting materials. S.
Rep., note 2 supra, at 15, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6938.
149. 126 CONG. REC. S10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
150. In discussing the scope of state power under 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) the Michigan appellate
court in Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 250, 237 N.W.2d 266, 276 (1975)
said:
Congress, thus, recognized the need for expertise and uniformity of regulation with regard to the handling of nuclear materials sufficient to form a critical mass, whose potential danger is clear. This potential danger and lack of expertise by state authorities
required Federal preemption. Congress authorized the turnover to states of those lesshazardous aspects of nuclear power which state agencies might be trained to regulate.
See also notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
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from the technical question, the amendment's sponsor articulated a
political problem which he intended to solve. He said:
It is extremely unfair to allow three States to become the "dumping
grounds" for waste which all 50 States generate. If other States are to
share in the benefits of nuclear power production and nuclear
medicine, they must begin to share in the responsibilities which include the unpleasant task of waste disposal.'15

This attitude surfaced repeatedly in the debates on the nuclear waste
bills. 152
While requiring each state to provide for the disposal of waste
generated within its borders, the low-level waste amendment also de-

clared that the disposal problem "can be most efficiently managed on a
regional basis."' 153 It authorized and encouraged states to form com-

pacts 54 or agreements with neighboring states, to establish regional facilities, and gave advance congressional consent to the states to bar the
importation of wastes generated outside the region after January 1,
1986.155 In contrast to the mandatory statement that each state is responsible for the disposal of waste generated within its borders, the

compact provision was intended to be permissive.

56

The low-level waste amendment was the only provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to survive the House-Senate Conference Com57
mittee. With minor changes in language, it was enacted into law.'
151. 126 CONG. REc. S10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
152. For example: "In the interest of fairness, I do not believe we should expect the people of
New York, or Illinois, or South Carolina to bear this burden of temporary storage with all of its
implications." Id. at S 10255 (daily ed. July 30, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph). The following
colloquy between Sen. Magnuson of Washington and Sen. McClure of Idaho illustrates the special concerns of a state hosting a national disposal site:
Sen. Magnuson: We are willing to have a facility to take care of the nuclear waste for
the region, but we do not want it shipped from other places, outside the region. We want
some other States to bear the burden also. No State wants nuclear waste. No State
wants it, no State.
Sen. McClure: I say to the Senator from Washington there is a very strong statement in
the bill with respect to the responsibility of States to in effect be responsible for those
wastes generated within their own States.
Id. at S 10258 (daily ed. July 30, 1980). See also id at S 10264 (remarks of Sen. Percy). In the
House debate, see, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. HI 1753 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Udall).
153. Low-Level Waste Act, § 4(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
154. The United States Constitution provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,. .. enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Congress has encouraged the states, for example, to form compacts
for solid waste disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6904(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) and water pollution
control, 33 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
155. Low-Level Waste Act, § 4(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
156. The compact provision states that "States may enter into such compacts as may be neces-

sary." Id. (emphasis added.)
157. 126 CONG. REC. S16545 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1980); id at H12494.
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After exempting nuclear materials produced by the federal government, the LQw-Level Waste Act declares:
Section 4 (a)(1) It is the policy of the Federal Government that(A) each State is responsible for providing for the availability of
capacity either within or outside the State for the disposal of lowlevel radioactive waste generated within its borders ...
(B) low-level radioactive waste can be most safely and efficiently
managed on a regional basis.
(2)(A) To carry out the policy set forth in paragraph (1), the States
may enter into such compacts as may be necessary to provide for the
establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for lowlevel radioactive waste.
(B) A compact entered into under subparagraph (A) shall not take
effect until the Congress has by law consented to the compact. Each
such compact shall provide that every 5 years after the compact has
taken effect the Congress may by law withdraw its consent. After
January 1, 1986, any such compact may restrict the use of the reof lowgional disposal facilities under the compact to the disposal
58
level radioactive waste generated within the region.1
RETURN TO STATE JURISDICTION-AUTHORITY OVER Low-LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND ASSOCIATED RADIATION

HAZARDS
In passing the Low-Level Waste Act, Congress established state
authority over a problem of nuclear development from which the states
had been barred' 59 or allowed only indirect control 16° under the doctrine of federal preemption. Aware of the dissatisfaction of many state
legislatures with federal nuclear policy, Congress created an area in
which the states are to be primarily responsible for the local disposal of
certain radioactive wastes. In reserving this responsibility for the
states, Congress ceded to them a degree of control over the extent of
nuclear benefits available in the state.' 6 ' A state which fails to provide
for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders would presumably thus limit itself in the use of nuclear processes
and materials which would generate such waste.
By this grant of responsibility to the states, Congress consented to
the states' exercise of their police power over an area formerly occupied
exclusively by the federal government. Although Congress can legislate to occupy a field, and thus preempt state action, 16 2 it can also re158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Low-Level Waste Act, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
See notes 26-61 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 62-86 and accompanying text upra.
See note 151 and accompanying text supra.
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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turn or reserve the power to regulate to the states.' 6 3 Congress may be
motivated by the need to involve the states to insure the effectiveness of
a federal program' 64 or by the understanding that federal expertise and
165
national guidance are no longer required.
The Low-Level Waste Act makes a clear statement of non-pre66
emption by declaring each state responsible for local waste disposal,'
and the legislative history supports the clear meaning of the language
used. 6 7 The legislative history also reveals that the bill's purpose was
to prevent the few states with commercial waste facilities from becoming "dumping grounds for the nation"' 68 and to compel other states to
169
share in the "unpleasant task of waste disposal."'
163. Eg., Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), wherein the Court stated: "It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it." Id. at 315.
164. In debate on S. 2189, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S9970 (daily ed. July 28,
1980), one Senator said:
Mr. President, I really believe that one of the greatest obstacles toward solving the waste
problem has been the past inability on the part of the Federal Government to work in
partnership with the States in addressing their very real and sincere concerns and their
fears in this area.
Id. at S9978 (remarks of Sen. Simpson). The Senate was aware that at least thirteen states had
taken action to block the possible siting of a federal disposal facility within their borders. Id. at
S9987 (remarks of Sen. Percy). See also Seiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposal. The Emerging
Issue of States' Rights, 13 AKRON L. REV. 261 (1979); Note, State Regulation ofNuclear Power
Production.- Facingthe Preemption Challenge From a New Perspective, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 134, 135
n.5 (1981).
165. In Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. I, 18-19 (1976), the
Court quoted with approval Rep. Stanton, a member of the House Committee on Public Works:
But atomic energy is a peculiar field. To date, the operation of the atomic energy program has been under the control of the Commission itself. Eventually, such control will
be delegated to the States as more and more knowledgeable people at the State level
become involved in the atomic energy program. That time, however, has not yet arrived
(quoting I Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act, Amendments of 1972,
93 Cong. 1st Sess. 554-55 (1973)).
In that case the Court held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), did not grant to the Environmental Protection Agency or to the states the
authority to require operators who produced radioactive wastes to secure permits regulating that
waste. 426 U.S. at 25. Congress responded to the Court's decision in Train by passing an amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which expressly subjects radioactive pollutants
to state and federal environmental programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. IV 1980). See Meek, Nuclear Power and State Radiation Protection Measures: The Impotence of Preemption, 10 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 1, 17-20 (1979).
166. The Low-Level Waste Act declares that "each State is responsible for providing.., for
the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders." Low-Level Waste Act,
§ 4(a)(I)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(a)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
167. The Supreme Court has required reference to the legislative history to discern the "plain
meaning" of statutory language, especially when a direct interpretation would mark a "significant
alteration of the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied in the AEA." Train v. Colorado Pub.
Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1976). See note 165 supra.
168. 126 CONG. REC. S10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
169. Id.
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In an action indicative of many states' efforts to control the flow of
radioactive waste across their borders, the people of the state of Washington passed by initiative the Radioactive Waste Storage and Transportation Act. 170 The Initiative "called for a ban on the 'importation
and storage of nonmedical radioactive wastes generated outside Washington, unless otherwise permitted by interstate compact.' "'17' It authorized the state to enter into agreements with other states for the
regional storage of radioactive waste, subject to approval by the state

legislature and by Congress.

72

The Initiative was challenged in federal district court 173 and declared unconstitutional in Washington State Building and Construction
Trades Council v. Spellman.' 74 The court based its holding on the findings that the initiative (1) was preempted by federal law 175 and (2) imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 76 Although
the court gave special attention to the Low-Level Waste Act, it failed to
apply it in a manner consistent with either its "plain meaning" or the
legislative intent. The court began its analysis by acknowledging that
the Low-Level Waste Act "does constitute a valid but limited grant of
authority to effectively ban the storage of certain waste."' 177 It proceeded, however, to negate that grant of authority by applying "estab78
lished judicial reasoning."
The Low-Level Waste Act contains two substantive provisions.
One grants each state the responsibility for providing for the disposal
or storage of low-level waste generated within its borders179 and the
170. See Washington Initiative No. 383, II ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1030 (1980).
171. Id.
172. Id. Governor Spellman of Washington indicated that negotiations for a regional compact would be a top priority of his administration. Id.
173. The initiative was challenged in two cases, Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981), and United States v. Washington, No.
C-81-190 (filed April 13, 1981) (E.D. Wash.), II ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2251 (April 24, 1981).
174. 518 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. Wash. 1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently affirmed the district court's decision and reasoning. 684 F.2d 627 (1982). The
following discussion is based on the district court's opinion, but references to relevant portions of
the court of appeals opinion will be made in accompanying footnotes.
175. 518 F. Supp. at 933.
176. Id. at 935.
177. Id. at 932, aft'd, 684 F.2d at 630. The Low-Level Waste Act grants the states responsibility over a limited class of radioactive wastes, excluding high-level radioactive wastes or spent fuel,
Low-Level Waste Act, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 202 1b(2) (Supp. IV 1980), and federally produced radioactive waste. Id. at §§ 3, 4, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021d (Supp. IV 1980). Thus the district court and
the court of appeals properly held that the state could not ban such radioactive waste under the
authority of the Low-Level Waste Act.
178. 518 F. Supp. at 931.
179. Low-Level Waste Act, § 4(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
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other provides for the formation of regional compacts. 8 0° The Washington State court failed to distinguish these provisions and thereby
negated the actual consent conferred to the individual states to control
exclusively local low-level waste.
The court found a "Congressional plan to place future responsibility on the individual states to dispose of their waste."' 8 ' It.applied the
permissive compact provision'8 2 which contains an exclusivity and consent provision to become effective on January 1, 1986, to the mandatory
provision delegating responsibility to the states. 8 3 Contrary to the
court, Congress did not intend to postpone local responsibility for lowlevel waste for five years. Indeed, in the Senate Committee report,'8 4
and on the floors of the Senate and the House,18 5 the need for prompt
action was stressed. Senator Hollings, a sponsor of the low-level waste
amendment, stated the need for immediate action when he said:
[t]he situation regarding the management of low-level waste has become acute due to a lack of a clear national policy ...
The amendment ... makes it clear that every State is responsible for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated ...
within its borders.
must proceed immediately to enact a clear naThe Congress
86
tional policy.'
The bill did not contain a provision for delayed effectiveness, and
therefore it became effective when signed by the President. 8 7
The relationship of the compact section to the rest of the Act requires immediate state authority over locally generated waste. The
amendment's sponsor explained it as follows: "we believe that
threatened closure or gradual reduction of intake at one or more of the
existing commercial sites can be used as an effective mechanism to encourage cooperative action by other States."' 88 The scheme provides a
strong bargaining position to states like Washington, which have com180. Id. at § 4(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
181. 518 F. Supp. at 933.
182. Id. at 931.
183. Id. at 933.
184. S. Rep., supra note 2, at 15, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6938-39.
185. See note 137 supra.
186. 126 CONG. REC. S10060 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Hollings).
187. The United States Constitution declares:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
he shall sign it ....
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in
like Manner as if he had signed it.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
188. 126 CoNG. REC. S10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
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mercial storage sites, in negotiations with neighboring states regarding
regional storage. Because states without disposal sites are now obligated to provide local state facilities, they will either cooperate with
states which have such facilities "[wlith the idea of eventually establishing an efficient, safe system of regional disposal sites . . . subject to

ratification by Congress at a later date,"' 8 9 or establish their own statewide facility. The court in Washington State, however, focused on the
date for prior consent to exclusive compacts as the controlling date for
the implementation of the Low-Level Waste Act, and thereby undermined the system of incentives and compulsion created by Congress. 90
The Washington Initiative, by authorizing the state to enter into compacts with other states, in fact, complemented the federal scheme.
In another instance of inverting congressional intent, the court correctly noted that the Low-Level Waste Act "recognizes the particularly
acute national problem of a high demand for storage and a dwindling
supply of storage capacity."' 91 When the bill was pending, only two
commercial low-level disposal sites were operating, one of which accepted only limited types of low-level waste. 92 Of the six facilities in
operation in the 1960s, four had been closed amid "increas[ing] criticism regarding their methods of operation."' 93 The solution to this
shortage of space was to encourage each state to provide for the disposal of locally produced waste, for "[i]f other States are to share in the
benefits of nuclear power production and nuclear medicine, they must
begin to share in the responsibilities."' 94 Congress expressed confidence that the states would cooperate to meet this responsibility 95 and
in the "great ingenuity and creativity on the part of the States."' 96 The
solution was to increase the supply of storage space available by promoting state action. The court in Washington State, however, held that
the state's action would "obstruct the efforts of Congress toward an orderly resolution of a significant [waste] problem."' 97 This holding is
189. Id.
190. 518 F. Supp. at 933. See 684 F.2d at 630. The Washington Initiative expressly author-

ized the state to enter into compacts with other states to provide them with access to its disposal
site. See notes 170-71 and accompanying text supra. It also delayed the imposition of the law for
one year to provide incentives to other states to enter into negotiations for a regional compact. 518
F. Supp. at 933.
191. Id. at 932.
192. Id. at 930.
193. S. Rep., supra note 2, at 15, reprinied in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6938.

194. 126 CONG. Rc. S 10058 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
195. Id. See National Governors' Association Task Force of Low-level Radioactive Waste
Disposal, Exhibit I, reprinted id. at S 10058-59.
196. Id. at S10060 (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
197. 518 F. Supp. at 933.
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inconsistent with Congress' expressed confidence and intent that individual state action would encourage and require other states to increase
the supply of storage space.
The Washington State decision, decided three and a half months
before the Ninth Circuit's decision in Padific Legal Foundation v. State
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 198 expresses the
broad federal policy objectives upon which the Northern States opinion' 99 was based. 20° It failed to recognize that the federal government
has made nuclear power an option-not a mandate. 20 ' The Washington
State court further found the purposes of the Initiative unacceptable.
The Initiative "was expressly based upon the State's police power to
protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Washington
State. ' 20 2 Although the court found this objective illusory, 20 3 this purpose was not reserved to the states under section 2021(k), and thus
would be preempted by the AEA. 2° 4 However, the Low-Level Waste
Act ceded to the states authority over low-level radioactive wastes regardless of purpose. Congress expanded the scope of state authority to
include all responsibility for low-level wastes, including the power to
regulate to protect against radiation hazards. Given this broadening of
state authority, and the Ninth Circuit's understanding of federal policy
as presenting an option to use nuclear science and power, the Washington Initiative should not have been found preempted by federal law.
Consent to State Jurisdictionand to ConsequentialBurdens on
Interstate Commerce
The Washington State decision was also based on the court's finding that the Initiative violated the Interstate Commerce Clause,20 5 because it impermissibly barred out-of-state waste from being transported
into and stored in Washington. Insofar as the Initiative covered highlevel and federally generated radioactive waste, the court was cor198. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981). See notes 62-85 and accompanying text supra.
199. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), a'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). See notes 26-61 and
accompanying text supra.
200. The Washington State court held that "since the Initiative significantly impairs the federal interest in encouraging the peaceful use of radioactive material and in solving the radioactive
waste problem, the Initiative cannot be harmonized with the Commerce Clause." 518 F. Supp. at
935.
201. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903, 928 (9th Cir. 1981).
202. 518 F. Supp. at 932.
203. Id. at 935.
204. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text supra.
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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rect. 206 However, in the Low-Level Waste Act, Congress consented to
state barriers to the interstate movement of privately produced lowlevel radioactive wastes.
The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
'20 7
Power . .. [tJo regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.

Congress can assert this power over a subject matter to preclude local
regulations or obstacles to interstate movement 208 or it can withdraw a
class of material from interstate commerce so as to subject it to local
209
regulation.
A clear example of congressional consent to state regulation is the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 210 wherein Congress declared:
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall
be subject to the laws of the several
21 States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
In rejecting a commerce clause attack upon a South Carolina statute

that discriminated against foreign insurance companies, the Supreme
Court in PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin2t 2 stated that there is "no
question of the validity of such a [discriminatory] state tax where Congress had taken affirmative action consenting to it or purporting to give
it validity. ' 21 3 The Court noted that the authority to adjust state and
federal power over interstate commerce lay with Congress; it was only
in the absence of congressional action that the courts were required to
step in.2I4 Furthermore, the Court assumed that Congress "must have
206. 518 F. Supp. at 931. See note 177 supra.
207. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208. See discussion in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947), and Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
209. In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), the Court held
that alcoholic beverages were subject to state regulation under the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.
§ 122. The Clark Distilling Court interpreted the statute "to validate states' laws prohibiting the
shipment of intoxicating liquor into the state,. . . and establishing that Congress does have some
power to remove from the states disabilities which, in the absence of congressional action, inhibit
the states in the regulation of interstate commerce." Note, CongressionalConsent to Discriminatory
State Legislation, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 935 (1945). In Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hofstetter, 384
U.S. 35, 42 (1966), the Court said that "a State is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce
Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or
consumption within its borders. Cf. Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), af'd, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971) (trade in alligator and
crocodile hides barred from interstate commerce under federal statute; trader subject to state penalties); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975)
(upholding Chicago's ban on the use of phosphates in detergents as a reasonable exercise of state
police power with only incidental effects on commerce).
210. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).

211. Id. at § 1012(a).
212. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
213. Id. at 421.

214. Id. at 423-25.
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had full knowledge" of the existence of state regulatory systems. 2t 5 By
declaring that insurance companies were subject to state law, "Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future
'21 6
state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.
This consent was effective notwithstanding prior judicial decisions in21 7
validating similar laws.
By consenting to discriminatory state regulation, Congress can
tackle exactly the kind of state-federal problems which arose under the
Atomic Energy Act. 2t 8 By insuring that "the immunity characteristics
of interstate commerce. . . [will not] in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection" to avoid local accountability, 2 19 Congress can
subject a class of materials otherwise in interstate commerce to state
control. Such immunity is imperative if the grant of power to the states
is not to be used to invert "state and national power, each in alternation
'220
to ward off the other's incidence.
In returning control over low-level radioactive waste to the states,
Congress consented to state regulation over that material and to the
state action necessary to effectuate the policy of local control. This action not only removed the preemption objections to state regulation,
but it effectively removed low-level radioactive waste from interstate
commerce protections. Congress "regulated" low-level waste by con22
senting to individual, and possibly conflicting, state regulation. 1
215. Id. at 430.
216. Id. at 429.
217. Id. at 425. The theory of congressional consent to state burdens of interstate commerce
has been explained as follows:
The trial courts would operate out on the front line, where the impact of state action on
interstate commerce is first felt, and they could appraise at close range the conflicting
state and national interests ...
If, the state law complained of were sustained in the courts, Congress could step in
and occupy the field if in its judgment the state action went too far. On the other hand,
Congress could obviate the results by giving its consent for the operation of the law.
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1940). An example of the
operation of this theory was congressional reaction to Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Group, Inc.,
426 U.S. 1 (1976). See note 165 supra.
218. One Congressman described the states' role in nuclear waste policy as "the dilemma
which has faced all of the branches of Government throughout the history of this Republic. That
is, how to adequately protect the States without violating the Federal good. . . . It raises the
State fist to, but does not intrude upon, the Federal nose." 126 CONG. REC. H11763 (daily ed. Dec.
3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Williams).
219. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (1917).
220. Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 412 (1946).
221. Cf. Inre Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891). In that case, the Court upheld the validity of
a Kansas statute which made it a misdemeanor to sell alcoholic beverages over a challenge that it
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. The Court found that Congress had "undenied" power to divest trade in alcoholic beverages of its interstate character and thereby subject it
to local regulation. Id. In describing the relationship between federal and state regulatory power
and the police power, the Court said: "the distinction which exists between the commerce power
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The Washington Initiative, barring the importation of certain radioactive wastes absent an agreement with the exporting state, was found
to impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce by the
court in Washington State.222 The court recognized that the Low-Level

Waste Act ceded some regulatory authority to the states. 223 It proceeded to analyze the state action under this authority not against the
consenting statute, but against cases where Congress had not exercised
its commerce power over a given subject. 224 The Supreme Court in
PrudentialInsurance225 responded to a similar presentation of precedent by saying:
In each [case] the question of validity of the state taxing statute arose
when Congress' power lay dormant. In none had Congress acted or
purported to act, either by way of consenting to the state's tax or
otherwise. Those cases therefore presented no question of the validity of such a tax where Congress had taken affirmative action consenting to it or purporting to give it validity. Nor, consequently,
226
could they stand as controlling precedents for such a case.
The Court in Prudential Insurance examined the words of the consenting statute and concluded that Congress had intended to validate
existing state regulation by "removing obstructions which might be
227
thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised,"
and by declaring it in the public interest for local state laws to control. 22 8 Such action was not beyond Congress' commerce power given

that "[ilts plenary scope enables Congress not only to promote but also
to prohibit interstate commerce. '"229 Similarly, looking to the LowLevel Waste Act, the court in Washington State would have discerned a
congressional intent to consent to state control over low-level radioactive waste to the extent of excluding out-of-state waste from its
23 0
territory.
In holding the Washington Initiative to be unconstitutional under
and the police power, which 'though quite distinguishable when they do not approach each other,
may yet, like the intervening colors between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the
understanding'...." Id. at 557.
222. 518 F. Supp. 928, 935 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1982). See
notes 174-206 and accompanying text supra.
223. 518 F. Supp. at 932, aft'd, 684 F.2d at 630.
224. 518 F. Supp. at 933-35. The court of appeals similarly applied a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 684 F.2d at 630-31.
225. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
226. Id. at 421.
227. Id. at 429.
228. Id. at 430.
229. Id. at 434. See id at n.45 for other cases to the same effect.
230. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. S10263 (daily ed. July 30, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Riegle):
With respect to the storage and disposal of spent fuel. . .I believe that the role of the
States must be absolute. . . . I believe it is essential that States be allowed to determine
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the Commerce Clause, the Washington State court also relied on the
Supreme Court's holding in the City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.23'
In that case, New Jersey enacted a law banning the importation of solid
waste materials, and operators of New Jersey land fills, as well as the
city of Philadelphia, challenged the ban. New Jersey argued that the
ban was a valid exercise of its police power to protect its citizens from
the health hazards associated with the accumulation of chemical dumps
and landfills,2 32 but the Court held that "whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is
2 33
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."
The sponsor of the low-level waste amendment and the National
Governor's Association Task Force on Low-level Radioactive Waste
Disposal, believed that the City of Philadelphia holding would not be
controlling in cases arising under the Low-Level Waste Act if Congress
expressly consented to individual, possibly discriminatory state action. 234 City of Philadelphia dealt with a single state unilaterally excluding out-of-state solid waste in contravention of a federal statute.
The federal Solid Waste Disposal Act,2 3 5 which creates a program of
financial and technical assistance to improve methods of waste disposal, declares:
that while the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue
to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies, the
problems of waste disposal as set forth above have become a matter
2 36
national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action.
The statute authorized states to enter into compacts, subject to congressional approval, but it did not establish a policy of state responsibility
nor did it cede primary control of the problem to the states. In contrast,
for themselves their own policies---especially when Federal policies may not adequately
protect their local safety, health and environmental concerns.
See notes 188-189 and accompanying text supra.
231. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
232. Id. at 625.

233. Id. at 626-27.
234. The National Governors Association Task Force report is reprinted in 126 CONG. REC.
S10058-59 (daily ed. July 29, 1980). Discussing the Philadelphia decision, the report said:
While the Court might view the disposal of low-level waste as posing more of a transportation risk, the host state's authority to exclude out-of-state waste from its site is in considerable doubt. This doubt could be dispelled if Congress expressly gave the states such
authority. For that reason, an exclusivity provision should probably be included in any
Compact Consent legislation.
Id. at S10059. The report added in footnote 10 that "lilt could be argued that exclusivity is necessary to the formation of a regional system."
235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp IV 1980).
236. Id. at § 6901(a)(4).
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the Low-Level Waste Act broadly grants to the states the responsibility
over civilian low-level nuclear waste, subject to no express limitation.
The fact that Congress gave advance consent to the exclusivity provision of prospective interstate compacts illustrates Congress' awareness
that exclusive, restrictive or otherwise discriminatory state action could
237
promote a national policy and should be encouraged.
The court in Washington State relied on City of Philadelphia,
which is of questionable precedential value, in holding that Washing23 8
ton could not exclude low-level waste generated outside its borders.
City of Philadelphia was based on a different statutory scheme, and
Congress, in passing the Low-Level Waste Act, discussed the case and
expressed consent to exclusivity to distinguish it.239 In addition, the
holding in City ofPhiladephiadoes not absolutely prohibit state bars to
the importation of hazardous materials because when "articles' worth
in interstate commerce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in
their very movement, States could prohibit their transportation across
state lines.''24° The Washington State court, in reviewing the Washington Initiative, minimized the state's health and safety concerns, which
24
are raised by the storage or disposal of any kind of radioactive waste. '
Congress was aware of the dangers "inhering in the very movement" of
radioactive wastes, 2 42 and it could be inferred that it intended to minimize the need for such interstate movement by delegating the responsibility for disposal of such toxic wastes to state governments.
The attempt made by Washington voters to restrict access to state
facilities for the disposal of radioactive waste did not survive challenge
in federal court. Although the Initiative covered all radioactive waste
237. See note 234 supra, and text accompanying notes 188-190 supra.
238. 518 F. Supp. at 933-34, a1 7'd, 684 F.2d at 632.
239. See Low-Level Waste Act, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2021b(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See also note
234 supra.
240. 437 U.S. at 622.
241. 518 F. Supp. at 935.
242. See, e.g., Sen. Har's comments on "away-from-reactor" storage:
[W]e are voting for massive transportation of nuclear waste and spent fuel all over this
country, and when 1 year from now or 2 years from now or 3 years from now Governors
rise up in arms, as they are going to do, and city councils rise up and mayors rise up, and
citizens groups rise up against the transportation of tons and tons of nuclear waste across
those roads and up and down the highways, through the towns, through the farmlands,

near the schools, and everything else, I hope Senators understand that that is what they
are voting for.
126 CONG. REC. S10252-53 (daily ed. July 30, 1980). See comments by Sen. Baucus for a version
of Sen. Hart's nightmare in Missoula, Mont., where a local ordinance banned the shipment of
nuclear materials through the city. Id. at S 10263; and Seiberling, Radioactive Waste Disposal: The
Emerging Issue ofStates'Rights, 13 AKRON L. REV. 261 (1979), for the reaction of the city council
of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, to the transportation of radioactive waste from the Three Mile Island
reactor through the state. See also note 230 supra.
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materials, it comported with the intention of Congress regarding the
solution to the low-level radioactive waste problem. The court's findings of preemption and of an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce were not consistent with the provisions of the Low-Level
Waste Act, were not mandated under prior judicial holdings of preemption under the Atomic Energy Act, and were not required under
judicial precedent interpreting the interstate commerce clause. Washington's exclusion of out-of-state waste was an available and foreseeable form of pressure, consistent with the Low-Level Waste Act, to
compel states without waste facilities to negotiate with Washington
concerning regional access to Washington's facilities or to provide for
243
their own local disposal.
CONCLUSION

Congress encountered serious political obstacles in its efforts to
legislate a national program to solve the radioactive waste disposal
problem. In response to the suggestions of state officials, Congress
adopted a policy that returned to the states the power to regulate and
control low-level radioactive waste materials. The states have reacted
to this new policy in various ways, depending upon their dependence
on the nuclear industry and upon their concerns about health and
243. Texas recently passed legislation closely tailored to the Low-Level Waste Act. 11 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 2260 (1981). The state law "limits operators of processing and disposal sites from
handling any [low-level] nuclear waste generated outside of Texas in the absence of an interstate
compact or reciprocal agreement." Id. at 2261. Unlike the Washington Initiative, this statute
does not cover any other type of waste, e.g. high-level waste or spent fuel, and therefore does not
infringe upon the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(8) (Supp. III
1979), or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2114 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
as amended by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5841-91 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). In accordance with the Low-Level Waste Act, Texas is using the threat of exclusion as a
means to encourage coordinated regional action on favorable terms.
Illinois has taken action to implement the Low-Level Waste Act, as well, despite continuing
difficulties with low-level radioactive waste facilities. The legislature authorized the Department
of Nuclear Safety to acquire "all ... lands, buildings and grounds which are to be designated as
sites for the concentration and storage of radioactive waste materials," and to retain permanent
title and ownership of all waste stored at the site in the name of the State. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch.
I 11 , 230.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). Although the Department of Nuclear Safety acknowledged that Illinois is not legally required to support the construction and operation of a low-level
waste site in the state, 5 Ill. Admin. Reg. 8254-55 (Aug. 14, 1981), it has published guidelines for
persons interested in building a facility in Illinois. Id. Illinois has also entered into negotiations
with twelve midwestern states to form a compact pursuant to the Low-Level Waste Act. Chi.
Sun-Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at 4. Perhaps because it generates the largest volume of low-level
radioactive waste in the region, Illinois is willing to host a regional facility. 5 Ill. Admin. Reg.
8254-55 (Aug. 14, 1981). Incentives to permitting a site within its borders include the prospect of
charging out-of-state users higher or additional fees, and the fact that Illinois uses a greater proportion of nuclear energy, and thus produces a greater amount of waste, than any of the other
midwest states with which it is negotiating. Id.; Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at 4.
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safety risks. By consenting to such diversity, which allows states, in a
limited sense, to opt out of both the benefits and burdens of nuclear
power and medicine, Congress took a positive step in bringing accountability and local choice to one of the more uncertain aspects of nuclear
technology. A new danger, however, is that the courts will frustrate the
effect of this shift by rigidly adhering to judicial decisions and conceptions of federal nuclear policy which no longer reflect the intent of
Congress.
SUSAN L. SATTER

